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I. INTRODUCTION
A dilemma between consumers and copyright owners has existed
for some time. 1 How much protection is required to facilitate the
creation of new works without alienating consumers? If copyright
owners are afforded fewer rights, they will experience reduced revenues
and be less motivated to create additional works. 2 Conversely, if creative
works are so highly protected, many consumers will be unable to afford
access to these works. Excessive intellectual property rights will lead to
an unbalanced, inefficient society with a lack of innovation. 3
The first sale doctrine, originally created by the courts, 4 has
successfully balanced these two competing interests in the past.
However, the advent and increasing popularity of digital media, coupled
with the uncertainty of the first sale doctrine’s applicability to digital
media, shifted the balance in favor of copyright owners at the dramatic
expense of consumers. Lack of proper technology and the United States
Copyright Office’s disapproval to extend the first sale doctrine to digital
media has led to failed Congressional attempts to amend the law. In light
of modified forward-and-delete technology, 5 it is time for copyright law
to emerge into the 21st century.
Part II of this comment will explain the history of the first sale

* Candidate for J.D. / LL.M. in Intellectual Property, University of Akron School of Law, 2015;
B.A. Government, California State University, Sacramento, 2010. The Author would like to thank
her husband, Louis, for his support, and the members of the Akron Law Review for their comments
and assistance in editing and publishing this Comment.
1. “[Sorting this dilemma] involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and
society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other
hand.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
2. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 22 (7th ed. 2012).
3. Id.
4. See generally Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
5. See infra note 7.
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doctrine, observe how Congress has modified the doctrine over time, and
examine how the courts have interpreted the doctrine in light of various
technological innovations. Part III will address the problems associated
with digital media and examine the concerns of both copyright owners
and consumers surrounding a digital first sale doctrine. Part IV will
discuss the recent federal district court case, Capitol Records, LLC v.
ReDigi Inc., 6 which dealt with the issue of the first sale doctrine’s
applicability to digital media, and explain why the court missed a prime
opportunity to improve copyright law and ensure its compatibility with
current technology. Part V offers a concise Congressional solution to
expressly allow the first sale doctrine’s application to digital media,
paired with some practical restrictions, to effectively balance the
interests of both copyright owners and consumers. Part VI concludes
that the first sale doctrine is currently broad enough to incorporate
digital media in order to enhance consumer rights in the modern age.
However, as the courts have declined to take up the issue, Congress can
create an expressly balanced “digital first sale doctrine,” 7 implementing
subtle solutions to curtail the concerns of copyright owners.
II. THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act expressly affords copyright
owners a list of exclusive rights: reproduction, preparation of derivative
works, distribution, and public performance or display. 8 The first sale
doctrine, articulated in section 109 of the 1976 Copyright Act, limits the
exclusive right of distribution to the initial sale or transfer of a
copyrighted work. 9 Consequently, consumers may make subsequent

6. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
7. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 79 (2001), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf
[hereinafter
DMCA
REPORT].The term “digital first sale doctrine” is frequently used in connection with this topic. It
references a potential defense to copyright infringement that would allow transfer of a digital work
over the Internet to another consumer and then removal of the digital work from the seller’s
electronic device. Id. at 48 n.272.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). This section also articulates that these rights are subject to and
limited by the exceptions listed in sections 107 through 121 of this title. Id. Copyright owners retain
the exclusive right to reproduce new copies of songs, including digital versions. See Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that the creation
of the first sale doctrine did not generate a “waiver of all the exclusive rights found in section 106”
of the Copyright Act); see also United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1979)
(finding that the copyright owner’s copying and publishing rights “remain intact,” despite the
reduction in vending rights).
9. Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act provides, in pertinent part: “the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession
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transfers without permission from the copyright owner and are not
subject to any restrictions by the copyright owner. 10
A. History
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.” 11 The first copyright provision
codified by Congress provided authors of maps, charts, and books the
“‘sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and
vending.’” 12 In 1908, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the
scope of a copyright owner’s rights in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus 13 and
rejected a publisher’s attempt to control the price for which consumers
could resell the books. 14 The Court acknowledged the limits of copyright
law and found that there was no such protection for copyright owners
after the initial sale (or disposal) of a particular copy of the work. 15
The judicial holding in Bobbs-Merrill effectively created the first
sale doctrine. Congress codified the doctrine in section 27 of the
Copyright Act of 1909. 16 This codification was not meant to change the
existing law but to expressly recognize the distinction “between the
material object and the right to reproduce copies thereof.” 17 Under the
first sale doctrine, a consumer may transfer a physical embodiment of a
copyrighted work, but the subsequent possessor has rights only to the
physical copy or material; the copyright itself is not transferred. 18
The first sale doctrine is currently codified in section 109 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act) and largely resembles the

of that copy or phonorecord.” 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
10. Id.
11. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972).
12. Brian Mencher, Comment, Digital Transmissions: To Boldly Go Where No First Sale
Doctrine Has Gone Before, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 47, 50 (2002) (quoting the first United States
Copyright Act, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124(1790)).
13. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
14. Id. at 351.
15. Id.
16. Katherine Elizabeth Macdonald, Comment, Speed Bump on the Information
Superhighway: Slowing Transmission of Digital Works to Protect Copyright Owners, 63 LA. L.
REV. 411, 420 (2003).
17. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 2222 (1909)).
18. Section 202 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides: “Ownership of a copyright, or of any
of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which
the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted
work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a
copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any material
object.” 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
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original codification from 1909. 19 Congress, however, made alterations
and updates to accommodate for technological advances and to ensure
the purpose of the Copyright Act continues to be satisfied. 20 Intellectual
property law, including copyright protection, seeks to balance the rights
of creators with the rights of individual consumers. 21 The first sale
doctrine furthers this goal by balancing copyright owners’ rights in
protecting their works with the property interests of consumers, 22 and it
has struck a favorable equilibrium between these competing interests.
The public benefits from this limitation because the first sale
doctrine reduces a copyright owner’s monopoly over copyrighted works,
allowing for secondary markets to legally operate. 23 Secondary markets
greatly benefit consumers by fostering competition, which decreases
prices and increases access to copyrighted works. 24 In addition, the
doctrine promotes privacy. Individual privacy rights are respected
because consumers do not need to notify copyright owners each time a
transfer is made. 25 Consumers can transfer works privately and
anonymously; this is especially beneficial when the works contain
provocative or stigmatizing content. 26
Copyright owners also maintain adequate protection under the first
sale doctrine; it is limited in scope and only applicable to the expressly
enumerated right of distribution. 27 There are two important limitations to
the first sale doctrine. First, the particular copy being transferred must
have been legally created.28 Second, the person transferring the copy
19. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 41 (1909), with 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1976).
20. Because copyright law is a “difficult balance between the interests of authors . . . in the
control and exploitations of their writings . . . on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in
the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, [the governing laws] have
been amended repeatedly.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
21. Susan A. Mort, The WTO, WIPO & the Internet: Confounding the Borders of Copyright
and Neighboring Rights, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 197 (1997).
22. See Victor F. Calaba, Quibbles ‘N Bits: Making a Digital First Sale Doctrine Feasible, 9
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
23. See Jonathan C. Tobin, Licensing as a Means of Providing Affordability and Accessibility
in Digital Markets: Alternatives to a Digital First Sale Doctrine, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 167, 171 (2010).
24. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 894
(2011).
25. See Stephen B. Popernik, Note, The Creation of an “Access Right” in the Ninth Circuit’s
Digital Copyright Jurisprudence, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 697, 731 (2013).
26. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1009 (1996).
27. Calaba, supra note 22, at 15. The right of distribution is defined in section 106(3) of the
Copyright Act as the right to “distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending[.]” 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 106. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted
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must be the owner of the copy; a licensee of a particular copy is not
allowed to make such a transfer.29 Both of these limitations enhance a
copyright owner’s ability to exercise control over his or her intellectual
property.
B. Congressional Amendments to the First Sale Doctrine
1. The BALANCE Act
The Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net
Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act was the legislature’s express
attempt to create a digital first sale doctrine. 30 The purpose of the
proposed BALANCE Act was to restore the traditional balance between
copyright owners and individual consumers in society. 31 The
BALANCE Act sought to amend the first sale doctrine by expressly
allowing for an owner of a lawfully-obtained digital work to dispose of
that work on the condition that the owner did not keep a copy. 32
However, the proposed bill never left the Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property. 33
Section 4 of the BALANCE Act would have extended the first sale
doctrine to certain digital works, effectively creating a digital first sale
doctrine. 34 The bill proposed multiple other amendments to the
Copyright Act, arguably removing too many protections for copyright
owners. 35 Thus, Congress attempted, and failed, to properly address the
issue of applying the first sale doctrine to digital media with the
work; thus, the copy must have been created by the copyright owner or with the copyright owner’s
permission.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 109. The copy must be lawfully owned by the transferor.
30. The BALANCE Act was a bill in the House of Representatives, which recognized that
the increasing developments in digital technology required updating the copyright law. See H.R.
1066, 108th Cong. § 2(5) (2003).
31. See Eric Matthew Hinkes, Access Controls in the Digital Era and the Fair Use/First Sale
Doctrines, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 685, 721 (2007).
32. H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003).
33. Hinkes, supra note 31, at 720.
34. Steve P. Calandrillo & Ewa M. Davison, The Dangers of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act: Much Ado About Nothing?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 349, 385-86 (2008).
35. Section 3 of the BALANCE Act would have amended section 107 of the Copyright Act
to allow fair use through digital transmission. See H.R. 4536, 109th Cong. § 3(a) (2005). Section 5
of the BALANCE Act amended section 1201 of the Copyright Act, which would allow
circumvention (prohibited by the DMCA) that enabled fair use. See id. § 5. Further, an additional
section, section 123, would have been added to the Copyright Act to provide for limitations on
exclusive rights and permissible uses of digital works. See id. § 3(b)(1). The BALANCE Act
narrowed copyright protections, stating that it would not constitute copyright infringement to
reproduce a lawfully obtained digital work for either archival purposes or display on a digital media
device. Id.
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BALANCE Act. 36 Subsequently, Congress adopted a “wait-and-see”
approach. 37
2. The DMCA
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted by
Congress in 1998 38 for two distinct purposes. First, Congress desired to
implement the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
Copyright Treaty of 1996, 39 which required the adoption of legislation
prohibiting the circumvention of encryption technology. 40 Second,
Congress aimed to modernize copyright law in light of developing
digital technologies.41 Primarily, Congress was concerned with increased
piracy due to the ease of copying and distributing digital media. 42 The
DMCA “prohibits the trafficking in or use of technologies designed
primarily to circumvent access controls.” 43 An access control measure
prevents unauthorized access to a particular work. 44 Circumvention of
access controls constitutes copyright infringement under the DMCA, and
such circumvention generally leads to copying digital media, which is
also copyright infringement. 45
The DMCA did not extend its prohibition to copy control
measures. 46 A copy control measure refers to “technological measures
that control or prevent the exercise of [exceptions to copyright
infringement].” 47 These exceptions are limitations to a copyright
owner’s exclusive rights, including a consumer’s rights under the first
sale doctrine, and are defenses to copyright infringement. 48 However,
these activities could theoretically result in liability under a statute that
prohibited circumvention of copy control measures, even though they

36. See generally H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003).
37. Eurie Hayes Smith IV, Digital First Sale: Friend or Foe?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 853, 860 (2005).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (2000).
39. World Intellectual Property Organization, Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121.
40. Macdonald, supra note 16, at 422.
41. Tobin, supra note 23, at 179-80.
42. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998). Current copyright law was deemed inadequate due to
the increasing popularity of the internet, the advent of digital media, and the growing number of
households with personal computers capable of reproducing digital media both easily and
flawlessly. Calaba, supra note 22, at 18.
43. Tobin, supra note 23, at 180.
44. Macdonald, supra note 16, at 423.
45. Id.
46. DMCA REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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are otherwise permissible under the first sale doctrine or another
copyright infringement exception. 49 Therefore, the drafters of the
DMCA chose not to prohibit the circumvention of copy control
measures. 50 The DMCA was meant to be minimalist legislation, so the
drafters elected not to overprotect copyrights. 51
C. The Courts’ Interpretations of the First Sale Doctrine and Infringing
Acts Related to Digital Media
The United States Supreme Court initially formed and applied the
first sale doctrine in Bobbs-Merrill. 52 However, courts have revisited and
made various subsequent interpretations of the doctrine since its
codification in 1909, most recently in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. 53 On March 19, 2013, the Supreme Court handed down a
monumental decision in Kirtsaeng that expanded the first sale doctrine
in favor of consumers by denying copyright protection to works
originally purchased outside the United States. 54 The Supreme Court
found that this holding struck the proper balance between copyright
owners and consumers. 55 The Supreme Court reasoned that copyright
owners would still be adequately protected because the first sale doctrine
has caused limited harm to them, while greatly benefitting consumers. 56
Courts have begun to examine cases that deal with digital media
transfers and whether such transactions violate a copyright owner’s
express rights. The specific issue of whether the transfer of digital media
files over the internet, where only a single file exists prior to and after
the transfer, constitutes reproduction under the Copyright Act was not
addressed prior to ReDigi. 57 However, similar issues that concern the
conundrum of outdated copyright law clashing with new technologies,
including issues of file sharing platforms and circumventing
technologies, have been presented to various courts in the United States.

49. Id.
50. Id. Congress sought to protect consumers from infringement when incidental digital
copies are created during the use and storage of digital media. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE
DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 2 (1998),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
51. Macdonald, supra note 16, at 422.
52. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908).
53. See generally Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
54. See id. at 1355-56.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1366.
57. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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1. Circumventing Technologies
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the seller of a
video tape recorder could be held liable for contributory infringement
because consumers of the product could use the device to create illegal
copies. 58 Sony developed and marketed a Betamax video tape recorder,
which it sold at various retailers. 59 Universal City Studios sued Sony,
alleging that this technological advancement permitted acts of copyright
infringement. 60 The Court determined that the decision hinged on
whether the video tape recorder was capable of significant noninfringing uses. 61
The Court focused its reasoning around the substantial noninfringing use of private time-shifting in the home, which is “the practice
of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and thereafter
erasing it.” 62 The record on appeal indicated that time-shifting expanded
the viewing audience, and many producers did not object to timeshifting for private use. 63 Private time-shifting constituted fair use, a
defense to copyright infringement embodied in section 107 of the
Copyright Act, 64 and thus shielded Sony from liability. 65 The Court held
that Sony could not be liable for contributory infringement, as a seller of
a circumventing technology, if the consumers of the technology did not
engage in infringing activity by using the video tape recorder. 66

58. See Sony Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 422.
60. Id. at 420.
61. Id. at 442.
62. Id. at 423, 442.
63. Id. at 444. Time-shifting expanded the potential viewing audience for cable programs
because viewers who were occupied during the original broadcast could record the programs to
view at a more appropriate or convenient time. Id. at 423.
64. Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides: “the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include — (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. §
107 (2012).
65. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 442.
66. Id. at 446-47.
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2. File Sharing Platforms
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of peer-to-peer file-sharing with respect to
copyright infringement. 67 Peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, including
Napster, permitted users to download digital media from a central server
without obtaining permission from the copyright owner. 68 Napster
specifically allowed users to upload their digital content to a server,
which was then housed in an online library and accessible to all Napster
users. 69 Other users could then search, view, and download the content
that fellow users uploaded. 70 The digital content housed in the uploaded
files, however, also remained on the original user’s computer. 71 A&M
Records and other plaintiffs, including Capitol Records, sued Napster for
copyright infringement, alleging that Napster’s business platform
violated their exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution. 72
The Ninth Circuit held that the unauthorized duplication of digital
music files over the internet infringed on a copyright owner’s exclusive
right to reproduce his or her own works. 73 Specifically, the court stated
that Napster users who upload files to the server for other users to copy
violate the distribution right, and those users who download the digital
copyrighted works violate the reproduction right. 74
III. THE UNIQUE CONCERNS GENERATED BY DIGITAL MEDIA
A. Distinguishing Characteristics
Digital media embodied in an electronic device is generally
considered a phonorecord within the meaning of the Copyright Act. 75
The term phonorecord refers to the material object in which sounds are

67. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001).
68. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005). Peerto-peer networks allow computers to communicate directly with other computers, without the use of
an intermediary server. Peer-to-peer network users benefit from increased efficiency because the
files do not have to travel through a central server and are thus not subject to glitches in the server.
Id. at 920.
69. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1011-12.
70. Id. at 1012.
71. Id. at 1011-12.
72. Id. at 1013.
73. Id. at 1014.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 648 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (discussing that a phonorecord is simply any material object in which a sound is fixed or
embodied). When an individual downloads a digital media file to a “hard disk,” this constitutes the
creation of phonorecord. Id. at 649.
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first fixed. 76 A work is fixed in a material object if it is “sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.” 77
Digital media can be considered quasi-property because it has finite
characteristics 78 and exists in encoded form, requiring specific software
and hardware to stream. 79 As certain software and hardware become
obsolete, the digital media relying on those devices will no longer be
operational, and original media will need to be purchased on updated
software or new hardware devices. 80 Five years is the average lifetime of
“most electronic storage media.” 81
Although digital media is similar to traditional analog media in
some respects, it is very different in other facets. Digital media does not
degrade in the same manner as analog media; 82 digital media can be
duplicated and distributed more easily than analog media; 83 and the
transfer of digital media is often characterized as a license,84 a technical
distinction that could render the first sale doctrine’s application moot.
1. Substantive Differences
Copyright owners assert that there is no such thing as “used” digital
media because media in this form does not degrade over time in the
same manner that physical copies do. 85 Physical copies deteriorate with
time and are traditionally resold at lower prices than new goods. Digital
media, however, does not possess the same corporeal qualities as
physical goods; 86 therefore, digital media is not “used” in the same
76. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). However, the Copyright Act excludes sounds associated with a
motion picture from the definition of phonorecords, and instead defines these works as copies.
Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the
Form(gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 991, 995 n.16 (2004).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
78. See Hayes, supra note 37, at 857 (finding that digital media is quasi-property because it
has a finite lifespan, relying on the material object in which the digital file is embodied).
79. See JEFF ROTHENBERG, AVOIDING TECHNOLOGICAL QUICKSAND: FINDING A VIABLE
TECHNICAL FOUNDATION FOR DIGITAL PRESERVATION 2 (1999), available at
http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/reports/rothenberg/pub77.pdf.
80. Id.
81. Hayes, supra note 37, at 857.
82. Henry Sprott Long III, Reconsidering the “Balance” of the “Digital First Sale” Debate:
Re-examining the Case for a Statutory Digital First Sale Doctrine to Facilitate Second-Hand
Digital Media Markets, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1192 (2008).
83. Tobin, supra note 23, at 177.
84. Calaba, supra note 22, at 9.
85. DMCA REPORT, supra note 7, at 82.
86. Tobin, supra note 23, at 171.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014

11

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 7 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 3

190

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[7.179

sense. 87 There is effectively no difference between new and used digital
media, but the used digital files could still be sold for a lower price
simply because they are categorized as used.88
However, digital media can still be worn, albeit in a different
fashion, due to its unique nature. Digital files require a medium in order
to be viewed or used and thus rely on the medium in which it is stored in
order to be useful to a consumer. 89 Mediums used to access digital media
are physical goods and possess many of the same characteristics as other
physical goods, including the ability to degrade over time. 90 Further, the
codes that allow the digital media to be “read” by software can become
obsolete over time, as technology rapidly changes and advances in the
modern digital age. 91
2. The Licensing Distinction
There is debate whether the transfer of digital media constitutes a
sale or a license. 92 Transferring digital media from copyright owners to
consumers has been characterized as both providing a license to the
consumer, where the copyright owner may continue to dictate how the
media can be used, and as a sale to the consumer, where the consumer
may use the media free from restrictions. 93 In order for the first sale
doctrine to apply to digital media, the transfer must be a sale.94 Under
87. Andrew Harmeyer, Can Digital Music Files Really Be Considered “Used?”— Online
Market Place ReDigi Sued by Capitol Records, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Feb. 2, 2012, 10:29 PM),
http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/11955.
88. See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (describing ReDigi’s business model, which allows users to purchase “used” digital media for
59 to 79 cents per digital song).
89. Long, supra note 82, at 1193.
90. Common mediums used today to access digital media files include personal computers,
mp3 players, and cellular telephones. A user must employ a physical good in order to access the
digital media. Hayes, supra note 37, at 856.
91. Long, supra note 82, at 1193.
92. John P. Uetz, Note, The Same Song and Dance: F.T.B. Productions, LLC. v. Aftermath
Records and the Role of Licenses in the Digital Age of Copyright Law, 57 VILL. L. REV. 177, 178
(2012).
93. See generally Maureen Steimer, Note, Restoring the Balance: Bringing Back Consumer
Rights in UMG Recordings v. Augusto by Reaffirming the First Sale Doctrine in Copyright Law, 16
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 313 (2009) (discussing the unresolved distinction between a sale and a
license).
94. Section 109(d) of the Copyright Act states that the first sale defense does not apply to
copies or phonorecords that were acquired “by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring
ownership of it.” 17 U.S.C. § 109(d). A license falls under this category because the consumer does
not acquire ownership of the copyrighted work. Licensing is a method by which copyright owners
allow consumers access to a particular copyrighted work without actually giving up ownership
rights. Therefore, copyright owners maintain control over the work because the consumer does not
have the right to dispose of the product without the copyright owner’s consent. See Jennifer Lahm,
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section 109(a) of the Copyright Act, a consumer must possess a lawfully
made copy or phonorecord to be legally allowed to sell or dispose of that
particular copy or phonorecord. 95 Therefore, the first sale doctrine is a
defense which may be applied where the alleged copyright infringer
owns the physical object embodying the copyrighted material.96 An
alleged infringer who only has a license to the copyrighted work does
not own the object embodying the work and may not freely dispose of
it. 97
To determine whether a first sale occurred, courts consider multiple
factors: (1) whether the copyright owner specifies that a consumer is
granted a license, (2) whether the copyright owner significantly restricts
the consumer’s ability to transfer the media, and (3) whether the
copyright owner imposes “notable use restrictions.” 98 These factors are
only considerations, none of which are dispositive; 99 however, courts
have found a transfer constitutes a license where the agreement imposes
“significant restrictions” on the consumer’s rights. 100 For example, a
transfer likely constitutes a license when a copyright owner denotes that
the media must be returned at a specific date or destroyed after a certain
period of use. 101
Courts have generally agreed that the transfer of software
constitutes a license agreement; 102 however, the issue of whether digital
Comment, Buying a Digital Download? You May Not Own the Copy You Purchase, 28 TOURO L.
REV. 211, 212 (2012).
95. Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act currently states, “the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy or phonorecord.” 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
96. See Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License:
Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European
Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001). When an author sells a copy of his copyrighted work, the
author no longer retains control over subsequent sales or disposals of that particular work. It is said
that the author’s rights have been “exhausted.” Id. at 14, see also Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d
1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that if the copyright owner’s initial transfer was a “first sale,”
then the consumer’s subsequent resale of the item would be protected by the first sale doctrine).
97. See Calaba, supra note 22, at 9-10. Under a license structure, the particular copy is not
“sold,” but merely “licensed” to a user. The first sale doctrine does not apply to a licensed work
because the copyright owner has not sold that work, and the consumer is purely a licensee, retaining
no rights under the first sale doctrine.
98. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110-11.
99. Id. at 1108.
100. Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir. 2006).
101. See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1977).
102. Maureen B. Collins, Crossing Parallel Lines: The State of the First Sale Doctrine After
Costco v. Omega, 8 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 26, 42 n.121 (2012); see, e.g., Vernor, 621 F.3d at
1110 (holding that “a software user is a licensee rather than an owner where the copyright owner (1)
specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the
software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions”).
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music is licensed or sold to the consumer has not yet been legally
settled. 103 If either the legislature or the courts determine that
transferring digital media constitutes a sale, the first sale doctrine could
presumably apply as a defense to copyright infringement.
B. Concerns of Copyright Owners
1. Piracy
Piracy consists of the “unauthorized use of another’s production,
invention, or conception,” including “illicit reprinting or reproduction of
a copyrighted book or print or unlawful plagiarism.” 104 Copyright
owners are concerned that there is an increased opportunity for piracy
with digital media because, unlike with analog media, consumers can
easily retain copies for themselves after selling a copy as an
“original.” 105 Facilitating piracy effectively erodes the exclusive right of
reproduction enjoyed by the copyright owner. Digital media can be
effortlessly duplicated and distributed to virtually anywhere in the world
with a few “clicks” on the computer. 106
Although a digital first sale doctrine arguably permits a system that
may promote piracy, the ability to pirate works exists regardless of
whether such a doctrine is implemented. However, the first sale doctrine
does not limit a copyright owner’s right to reproduction, 107 and this
exclusive right would remain intact even if the doctrine is applied to
digital media. 108 To be sure, it would still be illegal for a person to make
multiple copies without the copyright owner’s permission. 109 Consumers
103.
104.

Uetz, supra note 92, at 178.
WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF & SHARON J. ARKIN, NEW APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE § 17.06(2)(c) (2013). See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1266 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining “piracy” as “the unauthorized and illegal reproduction or distribution of materials
protected by copyright, patent, or trademark law.”) Piracy, as used in reference to digital media and
copyright law, includes activities such as downloading music from peer-to-peer networks (file
sharing) and burning copies of a copyrighted work (music, motion pictures, or electronic books).
105. DMCA REPORT, supra note 7, at 79.
106. Id. at 82. However, other forms of music media, including compact discs, do not contain
DRM or CMS technology, and the music from these discs can easily be copied in violation of the
Copyright Act. See Long, supra note 82, at 1198. DRM (Digital Rights Management Technology)
is calculated to “tether” the use of the particular media to the original purchaser. Id. at 1184. CMS
(automated digital copyright management system) generally comprises a series of codes that are
encrypted onto a digital media file, and the codes enforce copyright laws, including prohibiting
copying. See Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works: Adapting the First
Sale Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 29 (2002).
No solution is perfect.
107. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1976) (referencing only section 106(3), the distribution right).
108. Long, supra note 82, at 1199.
109. Section 109 of the Copyright Act does not apply to the reproduction right, and creating
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would effectively lose their access to and privilege to use the digital
media once it was sold, which is essentially the same outcome as with
selling physical copies of media.
Legal safeguards are in place to dissuade piracy. Past trends
demonstrate that once the government begins to prosecute individual
acts of piracy, the illegal activity curtails. 110 Copyright enforcement has
successfully deterred many users from illegally downloading and
transferring digital media. 111 A copyright owner may bring a civil suit
against an individual committing piracy; the judgments can be expensive
and similarly act to deter piracy. 112 Consumers of digital media would be
effectively dissuaded from retaining a copy of a digital file after selling
or transferring it to another user, as this would similarly constitute
copyright infringement.
2. Loss of Market Share
Copyright owners are also concerned that consumers who resell
their digital media will charge lower prices for their “used” media,
causing copyright owners to be edged out of their own market. 113
Copyright owners may see their works devalued due to companies
presenting their platforms as functioning secondary markets, while
actually operating in the primary market. 114 A secondary market has a
greater impact on the primary market with digital media than for
physical media due to the distinctions between the two. 115
It is possible that secondary markets may instead increase the value
of digital media in the primary market by ensuring the consumer
maintains the right to dispose of the work in any manner deemed

multiple copies of a copyrighted work continues to constitute copyright infringement under section
106. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 109.
110. See Hayes, supra note 37, at 857 (citing Lee Graham, Press Release, Consumers Delete
Large Numbers of Digital Music Files from PC Hard Drives, NPD GROUP (Nov. 5, 2003),
https://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_031105.htm). The press release provides data showing
that after the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) threatened to prosecute copyright
infringers who were illegally downloading digital works, 1.4 million households erased all digital
music files. Further, unlawful downloading activity declined by nearly 40%.
111. Hayes, supra note 37, at 857.
112. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 489, 515 (1st Cir.
2011) (Sony sued an individual defendant for copyright infringement after defendant illegally
downloaded Sony’s music from peer-to-peer file sharing platforms. Sony won the lawsuit, receiving
a judgment for $675,000.).
113. David Streitfeld, Imagining a Swap Meet for E-Books and Music, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/technology/revolution-in-the-resale-of-digital-booksand-music.html?_r=0.
114. Id.
115. DMCA REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
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sufficient. 116 Consumers may be willing to spend more on original
copyrighted works because they can recover a portion of the expense by
subsequently reselling the media. 117 A copyright owner would have to
determine whether to charge a higher price for digital media, assuming
consumers would pay more because they can recoup some of the cost
upon resale, or charge a lower price, effectively competing with the
“used” versions of their digital media.
An increase in market competition will only facilitate consumer
markets, 118 and any concern about competition should be outweighed by
the benefits to consumers and businesses in free market capitalism. 119
Copyright owners would not have to worry about overly competitive
prices or strong competition from users reselling their digital media
because of the nature of the free market. 120 Online retailers currently
allow individuals to sell textbooks or other merchandise through their
websites and charge the seller a certain percentage of the sale as
compensation. 121 Websites that would allow users to resell their digital
media would likely charge a similar fee to sellers.122 This fee structure
would ensure that most users selling their digital media would charge the
most competitive price. 123
3. The Copyright Office Recommended No Digital First Sale
Doctrine
Opponents of a digital first sale doctrine may reference the United
States Copyright Office’s 104 Report (Section 104 Report), which
recommended that Congress not expand the first sale doctrine to digital

116. Harmeyer, supra note 87.
117. Id.; see also Theodore Serra, Note, Rebalancing at Resale: ReDigi, Royalties, and the
Digital Secondary Market, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1753, 1778 (2013).
118. Mencher, supra note 12, at 62.
119. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 24, at 895 (noting that forcing copyright owners
to compete in secondary markets for digital media “provides its own incentives to create and
innovate”).
120. A digital first sale doctrine may also benefit copyright owners in the secondary market
because a digital copyright owner could potentially raise the prices on original media sold in the
primary market. Serra, supra note 117, at 1778. This is true because consumers will recoup some of
the excess cost upon resale in the secondary market. Id.
121. See, e.g., Participation Agreement, AMAZON (last visited Nov. 2, 2014), available at
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_sib?ie=UTF8&nodeId=116130
2.
122. Streitfeld, supra note 113.
123. ReDigi charges a fee of 60% of the purchase price for every digital song sold through its
Media Manager software. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
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media. 124 In 2001, the Copyright Office conducted an initial study on the
application of the first sale doctrine to digital media, considering
arguments for and against the proposal.125 The Copyright Office’s
analysis revolved around the perceived distinctions between physical
and purely digital media. 126
Ultimately, the Copyright Office recommended against a digital
first sale doctrine due to the inherent differences between analog and
digital media. 127 The Section 104 Report denoted that the Copyright
Office would not recommend modifying the law unless there was a
“demonstrated need for the change that outweighs the negative aspects
of the proposal.” 128 Additionally, the Section 104 Report further
indicated that no such need was apparent at that time. 129 Despite its
recommendations, however, the Copyright Office acknowledged that the
issues may require further consideration at some point in the future if
such concerns materialized. 130
“Forward-and-delete” technologies, which are programs that
effectively remove a digital work from a seller’s device after transfer,
was discussed and criticized in the Section 104 Report. 131 The Copyright
Office found that relying on a forward-and-delete scheme was not
feasible because such adequate technology did not exist at the time the
Section 104 Report was written. 132 Appropriate technology would need
to be “persistent and fairly easy to use” 133 to be adequate in the eyes of
the Copyright Office; otherwise, the technology would be too expensive,
and the cost would inevitably fall on consumers. 134
Congress chose not to take action in the creation of a digital first
sale doctrine after the Copyright Office recommended against it; 135
however, the Copyright Office did not completely foreclose the
124. Section 104 of the DMCA required the U.S. Copyright Office to analyze the prospect of a
digital first sale doctrine and submit its findings in a report. Mencher, supra note 12, at 58.
125. DMCA REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
126. Mencher, supra note 12, at 57.
127. The Copyright Office cited several inherent differences between digital media and
traditional analog media: (1) digital media does not degrade in the same manner, if at all, as analog
media; (2) digital media can be more easily copied and transferred than analog media, leaving open
the possibility to increased piracy; and (3) a secondary market for digital media work will cause
indefinite harm to the market for the original copyrighted works. See DMCA REPORT, supra note 7,
at xix.
128. Id. at xx.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Mencher, supra note 12, at 59.
132. DMCA REPORT, supra note 7, at 163.
133. Id. at 130.
134. Id. at 98.
135. Hayes, supra note 37, at 860.
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application of the first sale doctrine to digital media. Adequate
technology, as defined by the Copyright Office, has been developed
since the Section 104 Report was written, 136 and there is currently such a
need for change that overshadows the negative facets of a digital first
sale doctrine. The issue has materialized in the courts and is ripe for
Congressional review because modern consumers have begun to
purchase an increasing amount of digital media, and the copyright laws
may not be robust enough to compensate for this technological
revolution. 137
C. Concerns of Consumers
Consumers largely support applying the first sale doctrine to digital
media because, otherwise, consumers have no meaningful manner in
which to dispose of a portion of their goods in the modern world. 138
Further, the unrestricted alienability of personal property is a foundation
of American jurisprudence. 139 Consumers expect to be able to dispose of
their property as they see fit, and digital media is no exception.140 When
consumers “purchase” digital media from a website, they expect to own
that media. 141 The button says “buy now,” but the consumer is
effectively only renting the digital media because the copyright owner
maintains significant control over the product after the first sale. 142 The
courts created the first sale doctrine to expressly enforce an implicit
limitation on the distribution right, whereby a copyright owner could
control only the first distribution of a copyrighted work. 143 The first sale
doctrine may be appropriately applied to digital media in light of

136. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(describing ReDigi’s version of forward-and-delete technology that automatically detects duplicate
copies of a single digital file after the file has been uploaded to ReDigi’s server for resale).
137. Long, supra note 82, at 1190 (citing Nick Wingfield & Merissa Marr, Apple Computer
Aims to Take Over Your Living-Room TV, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2006, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB115808098293160780); see also Perzanowski & Schultz,
supra note 24, at 890 (finding that digital music downloads are increasing while CD sales are
decreasing).
138. Michael R. Mattioli, Cooling-Off & Secondary Markets: Consumer Choice in the Digital
Domain, 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 227, 247 (2010) (discussing the fact that many college students
purchase textbooks in hard copy form so that they can resell the textbooks at the end of the semester
and that there is no meaningful way to dispose of digital versions of these same textbooks).
139. Mencher, supra note 12, at 61.
140. Long, supra note 82, at 1200.
141. Id. at 1198.
142. Streitfeld, supra note 113.
143. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 351 (1908) (finding that the authority to
control subsequent sales by a consumer was not a right afforded by copyright law or within
Congress’ intent to enact).
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consumer expectations and the doctrine’s intended limitation on the
distribution right.
Not only are private individual consumers at a loss without a first
sale doctrine to protect their property rights in the modern digital world,
but the issue is affecting businesses as well. Various companies are
attempting to create innovative platforms that permit consumers to sell
and purchase their “used” digital media online. 144 These platforms
advance technology and sync with modern consumer trends. Recently,
Amazon acquired a patent on a system for a secondary market for digital
media. 145 This system mimics ReDigi’s secondary market model, which
was stifled by the court’s narrow interpretation of the first sale doctrine,
discussed below in Part IV. Both systems involve a version of
innovative “forward-and-delete” technology.
New “forward-and-delete” mechanisms make a digital first sale
doctrine feasible, while balancing the interests of copyright owners.
“Forward-and-delete” devices are a technological means by which
businesses can ensure consumers are not retaining copies of sold digital
media because the programs utilizing this technology will automatically
delete the transferred digital media or will virtually do so. 146 Under this
scheme, consumers can sell or transfer their legally acquired digital
media, and only one copy of the file exists at the end of the
transaction. 147
IV. THE REDIGI CASE
The court in ReDigi could have applied the first sale doctrine to
144. These innovative companies include Apple, ReDigi, and Amazon. On March 7, 2013, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office published Apple’s application for a patent for a
secondary digital marketplace. Streitfeld, supra note 113. Apple’s platform allows users to sell or
transfer digital movies, digital music, e-books, and software to other users by transferring the files.
Id. This method allows only one copy to exist at any given time, and only one user is able to access
that single copy at any given time. Id. Apple describes the process by which the digital media is
exchanged as a transfer of the particular digital file; therefore, no reproduction occurs. Id. See also
infra note 159 (describing ReDigi’s company model) and note 145 (describing Amazon’s patented
secondary marketplace for digital media). Both Amazon’s and Apple’s platforms include a “data
store” system. Each user’s media is maintained in a personalized store, and the system automatically
deletes the digital file from the original owner’s store upon transfer to another user. Streitfeld, supra
note 113.
145. Secondary Market for Digital Objects, U.S. Patent No. 8,364,595 (filed May 5, 2009)
(issued Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Amazon Patent]. This innovative system is similar to ReDigi’s
platform that was struck down by the court. Amazon describes this system as “[a]n electronic
marketplace for used digital objects. Digital objects including e-books, audio, video, computer
applications, etc., purchased from an original vendor by a user are stored in a user’s personalized
data store.” Id. at [57].
146. DMCA REPORT, supra note 7, at 81-82.
147. Id. at 82.
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digital media. However, the court failed to apply the first sale doctrine in
this seemingly appropriate case, expressly stating that the decision to
expand the law must be both determined by and implemented by
Congress. 148 ReDigi’s business model incorporates numerous methods
that do not condone illegal proliferation of copyrighted works; it simply
provides consumers with a legitimate means to dispose of their lawfully
obtained digital media in the modern world. 149 ReDigi’s methods
include a form of modern forward-and-delete technology, a system for
discerning illegal activity, and the use of penalties for unlawful acts. 150
The court in ReDigi found that the first sale doctrine could not
apply to digital media because the method of transferring digital media
necessarily implicated the reproduction right, as a new copy is
unavoidably created. 151 While this may be true in a technical sense, the
result cannot logically be what Congress intended because the
consequences are absurd. Although courts have held that these necessary
temporary copies are fixed copies under the Copyright Act, 152 Congress
granted a fair use exception to the incidental temporary copies created
and stored in RAM 153 during streaming. 154 In creating this necessary
exception, the legislature established that these temporary copies are not
subject to copyright infringement. 155 The logic behind this exception
could reasonably be extended to the incidental copies that are necessarily
created when digital media files are transferred between users in order to
circumvent the absurd effects that result from the ReDigi court’s strict
interpretation of the Copyright Act. 156
A. Background of the Case
ReDigi presents itself as “the world’s first and only marketplace for
digital used music.” 157 ReDigi first launched its website in October
2011, inviting consumers to sell any legally acquired digital media and

148. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(determining that Congress must extend the first sale doctrine to digital media).
149. Id. at 645.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 649-50.
152. See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993).
153. “RAM [random access memory] can be simply defined as a computer component in
which data and computer programs can be temporarily recorded.” Id.
154. DMCA REPORT, supra note 7, at 57.
155. Id.
156. The ReDigi court recognized that reproduction necessarily occurring when files are
transferred to different locations on devices would be protected under various doctrines or defenses.
See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 651.
157. Id. at 645.
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buy used digital music from others for less than the new version on
iTunes. 158 ReDigi’s original business model required a consumer to
download “Media Manager” 159 to a computer prior to selling any digital
media. 160 Media Manager subsequently detected and compiled a list of
digital music files from the computer, and the consumer could then
upload the digital songs to ReDigi’s server to be sold. 161 Once sold to
another user, Media Manager did not automatically delete the digital
media file from the seller’s computer, but the software detected
duplicates and prompted the seller to delete the file or be suspended
from using ReDigi. 162 The issue in ReDigi focused on interpretations of
how this server functioned in relation to copyright law and the manner in
which digital media was transferred by ReDigi’s software. 163
Capitol Records brought suit against ReDigi in the Southern
District of New York for copyright infringement under the Copyright
Act. 164 Capitol Records insisted that ReDigi’s business plan inherently
required that new copies of each file be created, a right purely reserved
for the copyright owner, in order to transfer the digital work from the
seller’s computer to ReDigi’s server and subsequently from the ReDigi
server to the buyer’s device. 165 ReDigi argued that its secondary market
business model was protected by the first sale defense because the
transfers merely involved “migrating” a digital music file from the
seller’s computer to the buyer’s computer. 166
The court granted summary judgment in favor of Capitol Records
after determining ReDigi engaged in copyright infringement and after
declining to apply the first sale doctrine to digital media. 167 The court
reasoned that because the transfer of digital media created a new copy of
158. Id.
159. “Media Manager” is a program used by ReDigi that scans the consumer’s computer and
creates a list of digital songs that qualify for resale. A file is only eligible if it was originally
purchased in digital form from either iTunes or ReDigi. The Media Manager software continually
monitors the consumer’s computer, and any attached devices, to ensure that the consumer does not
retain copies of digital songs already sold. When a lingering copy is found, the consumer is
prompted to delete the copy or be suspended from the database. See id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 650 n.5.
163. Capitol Records asserted that ReDigi’s system infringed its reproduction and distribution
rights; however, ReDigi claimed its business actions were protected by the fair use and first sale
doctrines. Id. at 647.
164. Id. at 646-47. Capitol Records first sought to shut down ReDigi’s secondary market
through a preliminary injunction; however, the federal judge denied this request. Streitfeld, supra
note 113.
165. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d. at 645-46.
166. Id. at 645.
167. Id.
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the work, and the Copyright Act expressly reserved this right for the
copyright owner, the first sale doctrine did not apply to digital media. 168
Additionally, the court declined to hold that the first sale doctrine
became ambiguous in light of digital media. 169 In so holding, the court
misconstrued the first sale doctrine and failed to apply it as a defense in
an appropriate case. The court’s holding created highly unbalanced
precedent that significantly disfavors modern-age consumers.
B. Precedent and Policy
1. The Courts Have the Authority and Ability to Declare a Digital
First Sale Doctrine
The court in ReDigi chose not to modify the law and determined
that any changes to the first sale doctrine would need to come expressly
from Congress. 170 In deferring the decision to the legislature, the court
reasoned that Congress possesses “the constitutional authority and the
institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
technology.” 171 The court found that it could not permit a blanket
adoption of a digital first sale doctrine when Congress has not yet chosen
to do so. 172
The Constitution assigns Congress the duty of defining the limits of
protection that should be granted to copyright owners in order to provide
the public with appropriate access to their work product. 173 Once
Congress defines the limits, however, it is the duty of the courts to
interpret what the law is.174 The ReDigi court’s strict perception that
Congress must change the copyright law is unwarranted, as the court has
the duty to interpret the law as it currently exists and apply the law to
contemporary issues. 175
168. Id. at 655.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 660.
171. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). The Court
also stated that “[s]ound policy, as well as history, support[ed] [its] consistent deference to Congress
when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.” Id.
172. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
173. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429.
174. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that once Congress has defined the limits of the
law, it is “the province and duty of the [courts] to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
175. The courts are required to apply the current copyright laws to new technology, even
though Congress may eventually “take a fresh look at [the issue].” See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 456.
Although Congress is equipped to resolve conflicts of new technology and the law, it is the court’s
task is to resolve such issues “in the light of ill-fitting existing copyright law” in the meantime. Id.
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Additionally, the first sale doctrine was originally a common law
principle, which Congress later codified and added to the Copyright
Act. 176 In creating this important doctrine, the court interpreted the thenexisting Copyright Act and found that the law did not afford copyright
owners continued protection over a particular copy of a work under the
distribution right once the initial disposal of that copy was made. 177
Curiously, in ReDigi, the court chose not to interpret the judicially
created doctrine without initial clarification from Congress; however,
Congress has already endorsed a broad interpretation of copyright law
by the courts. 178
The ReDigi court failed to apply the essential concept of media
neutrality, which encourages courts to broadly construe copyright laws
in order to compensate for the frequent advancements in technology. 179
The concept of media neutrality refers to the theory that a copyright
owner’s rights remain identical whether the media is fixed in digital or
analog form. 180 Under this concept, it logically follows that a consumer
should also enjoy the same rights despite the form in which the media
exists. Media neutrality affords courts the flexibility to expand copyright
law in order to facilitate its application to new technological
advancements. 181
Congress adopted the principle of media neutrality after the United
States Supreme Court’s narrow decision in White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 182 In revamping the Copyright Act,
Congress broadened its scope by adding the language “now known or
later developed” in order to incorporate existing and future methods in
which copies or phonorecords can be fixed. 183 By inserting this language
into the various definitions within the Copyright Act, Congress
expressly left the statute open to both interpretation and application to
new technologies. 184 Forward progress should be encouraged, and the
courts need to reaffirm this policy through broad interpretations and the
concept of media neutrality. It would be time consuming, costly, and

at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
176. Macdonald, supra note 16, at 420.
177. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
178. Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, and New
Technologies, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 427, 428 (2005).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
183. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining copies and phonorecords).
184. Congress also defined “‘device’, ‘machine’, or ‘process’ [as] one now known or later
developed.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
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counterproductive for Congress to reconvene and deliberate on the
copyright laws each time a new technology emerges.
2. The Court’s Interpretation Yields Impractical Results
The first sale doctrine was enacted prior to the conception of media
in a purely digital form. 185 The ReDigi court found that the statute did
not necessarily exclude digital works because the owner of a particular
phonorecord, “be it a computer disk, iPod, or other memory device,”
may sell that phonorecord to which the digital media was originally
downloaded. 186 The court recognized that selling the entire media device
may be impractical, but it did not produce an absurd result. 187
Although the statute may literally apply to digital media, the court
incorrectly determined that this conclusion did not create an absurd
result. 188 Consumers generally store digital media on personal
computers, iPods, or cellular telephones, and it is illogical for a
consumer to sell the entire technological device each time he or she
wishes to dispose of digital media files. The buyer may only want to
purchase the digital media embodied in the device, not the owner’s
multitude of other personal files or programs, but because the buyer
must purchase the entire electronic device, the buyer would unavoidably
pay a disproportional amount to receive the desired media file. Granted,
the purchaser would also receive the electronic device, but this market
structure is impractical and cumbersome. 189
Transferring digital media with this approach would be costly and
undesirable in comparison to the market for traditional analog media.
Not only would purchasers have to pay a high price, but the sellers
would have to purchase a new electronic device each time they made a
sale. Again, because electronic devices tend to be expensive, this result
is impractical and absurd. The result would ultimately lead to a sustained
monopoly, which conflicts with the Copyright Act’s general purpose of
facilitating a temporary monopoly, and fails to sufficiently balance the

185. Id.
186. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
187. Id. Courts should avoid a literal application of a statutory provision that would lead to
unintended consequences or an absurd result whenever the statute may be reasonably interpreted in
a manner that is consistent with the legislative purpose. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 20
(1980); see also Value Vinyls, Inc. v. United States, 568 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
188. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 656 (finding that, although transferring the entire electronic
device in order to dispose of digital media files was “onerous,” the limitation was not absurd).
189. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (concluding that consumers will lose if the seller’s price is too high and the individual
buyer cannot afford to purchase the work).
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rights of consumers against the rights of copyright owners. 190 An
additional purpose of the Copyright Act is to promote innovation; 191
however, the statute no longer encourages innovation if each company
that invents a technology with the purpose of functioning in the modern
market is found liable for copyright infringement. 192
The ReDigi court also weighed more heavily the concerns of
copyright owners against the concerns of consumers. 193 Traditionally,
however, in viewing reward to a copyright owner as an ancillary
consideration to public benefit, copyright laws generally favor the
consumer. 194 The Supreme Court determined that the “‘primary
object[ive] in conferring the monopoly [on copyright owners] lie[s] in
the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.’” 195
Consequently, the court should have afforded more weight to the
apprehensions of consumers before simply finding that the concerns of
copyright owners overpower the court’s ability to apply the first sale
doctrine to digital media. Additionally, for the reasons provided and
discussed in Part III above, the court’s concerns regarding the inability
of digital media to degrade and the effects of digital media on market
competition are misplaced. 196
3. The Statute’s Purpose and Plain Language Permit a Digital First
Sale Doctrine
The court applied dictionary definitions to various statutory terms
and narrowly construed those definitions to find that ReDigi’s business
model was inherently infringing at its core. 197 The court defined the
word reproduction to mean “to produce again” or “to cause to exist
again or anew.” 198 Specifically, the court focused its analysis on the
190. Id. at 429 (noting that copyright law is intended to promote public access to
copyrightable works and provide a “limited period of exclusive control” to the copyright owner).
191. See Macdonald, supra note 16, at 414 (stating that stimulating artistic creativity to benefit
the public is the primary purpose of copyright law).
192. Amazon received a patent for a secondary market for digital media in January 2013 and
has yet to implement this technology. See Amazon Patent, supra note 145.
193. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 656 (citing DMCA REPORT, supra note 7, at 11) (determining
that copyright owners would be negatively impacted by various factors).
194. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
195. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). See
also Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 432 (finding that creative works should be incentivized for the ultimate
purpose of “broad public availability”).
196. See supra Part III.
197. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 655 (finding it impossible to sell digital music using ReDigi’s
server without necessarily creating additional copies of the copyrighted work in violation of the
Copyright Act).
198. Id. at 650.
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finding that the creation of a new material object constituted copyright
infringement, and not merely the creation of an additional material
object. 199
The dictionary definitions provided by the court are literal and
rigid, and other common definitions could easily yield a different
interpretation and an opposite result in the outcome of the case. Where
multiple interpretations exist, the court must embrace the interpretation
that does not produce an illogical result; 200 therefore, the court erred in
ReDigi by selecting the rigid definitions that led to an impractical
outcome. Contrary to the dictionary definition selected by the court, the
term again is also defined as “once more” or “in addition.” 201 Therefore,
superimposing the relevant definitions, reproduction means “to produce
in addition.” Moreover, the term copy is defined as “one in a series of
reproductions.” 202 Either of these dictionary definitions shifts the focus
to additional copies rather than simply any new copy. In selecting the
appropriate definition, the court should have looked at whether the
transfer of digital media on ReDigi’s server was more like selling a
single used album or burning an additional copy. 203
It is also important to consider that the Copyright Act is primarily
concerned with the broader issue of the creation of multiple copies, not
the creation of a new copy when only one copy exists before and after
the transformation, because the statute’s main purpose is to “secure [for
copyright owners] the right of multiplying copies of the work.” 204 With
this purpose and the alternative definitions in mind, the first sale doctrine
is written broadly enough to apply to digital media in a more traditional
sense than requiring sale of an entire electronic device.
4. The Prospect of a Digital First Sale Doctrine Does Not Conflict
with Prior Case Law
Although, there is limited authority on the issue presented in
ReDigi, 205 the court misuses the appropriate existing precedent. The
199. Id. at 649.
200. See United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931) (stating that “all laws are to be given
sensible construction”).
201. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 23 (11th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 276.
203. James Rosenfeld & Eric Feder, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, The Aereo and ReDigi
Decisions: Courts Continue to Wrestle with the Application of Copyright Law to the Redistribution
of Digital Content (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.dwt.com/The-Aereo-and-ReDigi-Decisions-CourtsContinue-to-Wrestle-With-the-Application-of-Copyright-Law-to-the-Redistribution-of-DigitalContent-04-09-2013/.
204. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (emphasis added).
205. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating
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ReDigi court cited London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1 as supporting
precedent for the proposition that a digital transfer creates a new
phonorecord each time it is transferred to a different device.206 In
London-Sire Records, the court addressed whether users of peer-to-peer
software violated the distribution right. 207 The court focused its analysis
and narrowed its holding to the fact that users were creating multiple
copies of one digital music file. 208 The court in ReDigi dismissed the
notion that the court in London-Sire Records was concerned with
multiple copies of a copyrighted work and admitted to expanding the
holding in London-Sire Records to include the creation of any new copy
as infringement. 209 The ReDigi court did not cite any prior case that
agreed with this expanded interpretation.
The court in ReDigi also distinguished the case from C.M. Paula
Co. v. Logan. 210 The defendant in C.M. Paula used chemical compounds
to lift images from greeting cards and impress these images on plaques,
which were subsequently sold for profit. 211 The court in C.M. Paula
reasoned that infringement did not occur in that case because if the
defendant wished to make and sell 100 pieces of work, the defendant
would have to purchase 100 different copyrighted works to do so. 212 The
ReDigi court erroneously distinguished the case from C.M. Paula. The
theory behind the process used by ReDigi is no different than the theory
behind the non-infringing product in C.M. Paula because if a consumer
wishes to sell 100 songs using ReDigi’s server, the consumer would
have to legally purchase 100 songs. ReDigi’s software does not permit
users to keep a copy of a digital work after transfer to another user.
Moreover, the creation of additional copies from one original is not
permitted without the copyright owner’s consent. 213
The ReDigi court incorporated Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
that the exact issue presented was one of first impression for the court and had not yet been litigated
in any jurisdiction).
206. Id. “When a user on a peer-to-peer network downloads a song from another user, he
receives into his computer a digital sequence representing the sound recording. That sequence is
magnetically encoded on a segment of his hard disk (or likewise written on other media.) With the
right hardware and software, the downloader can use the magnetic sequence to reproduce the sound
recording. The electronic file (or, perhaps more accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard
disk) is therefore a ‘phonorecord’ within the meaning of the statute.” London-Sire Records, Inc. v.
Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008) (emphasis in the original).
207. London-Sire, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 166.
208. Id. at 169.
209. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
210. See generally C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
211. Id. at 190.
212. Id. at 190-91.
213. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Specifically related to this discussion, a consumer could not create 100
copies from one lawfully obtained digital media file and sell those 100 copies to various purchasers.
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City Studios, Inc., introduced and discussed in Part II.C above, and
determined that ReDigi was incapable of a non-infringing use by
design. 214 In Sony, the Supreme Court struck the proper balance between
protection and innovation, finding that providing equipment capable of
creating copies did not constitute copyright infringement, so long as the
equipment was largely used for legitimate purposes. 215 This holds true
even if the copying device may also be used for infringing purposes; the
device simply must be “merely capable of substantial non-infringing
uses.” 216 The Sony Court acknowledged that some users will take the
unlawful route, but the Court did not find this persuasive when holding
otherwise would burden the majority of consumers. 217
If the proposition that Congress did not intend the incidental
copying of digital files during transfer to constitute copyright
infringement where only one file exists before and after the transaction
is accepted, ReDigi’s platform design is certainly capable of substantial
non-infringing uses. ReDigi is set up so that users can transfer their copy
of a certain media file to another user, but the original users cannot
retain a copy of that digital file on their device. 218 Although ReDigi does
not automatically delete the digital files from the seller’s computer upon
transfer, these files are detected by ReDigi’s software and the user is
prompted to delete the file or be suspended from using the server.219
While some users may not delete their original copies and choose to
remain suspended from ReDigi’s server, common sense dictates that
most users will likely comply with the rules in order to maintain the
ability to sell or transfer their digital media to other users. Therefore,
ReDigi’s equipment is capable of substantial non-infringing uses, and
ReDigi cannot be held liable for copyright infringement under Sony.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE DIGITAL MEDIA DILEMMA
As previously outlined in this comment, the courts have the ability
to determine that the first sale doctrine applies to digital media for three
major reasons: (1) Congress added broad language to the Copyright Act;
(2) the policy to promote innovation is stifled without a digital first sale
doctrine; and (3) prior case law does not bar this conclusion. The issue
214. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
215. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 444 (finding that an injunction depriving consumers of equipment “capable of some
noninfringing use would be an extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented in copyright
law”).
218. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
219. Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol7/iss2/3

28

Dobson: ReDigi and the Resale of Digital Media

2015]

REDIGI AND THE RESALE OF DIGITAL MEDIA

207

came before a federal court, and the court chose not to extend this
essential doctrine to digital media, explicitly deferring to Congress on
the issue. 220 Due to the major policy implications—including the
creation of a sustained monopoly, the expectations of consumers, and the
potential harm to copyright owners—Congress must take up the issue
and implement clear legislation that allows for digital media to be sold
and transferred in the same manner as traditional analog media. The two
may have different physical characteristics, but technology is always
changing; therefore, the laws must similarly evolve and afford the
appropriate rights to individuals. The wait-and-see approach, previously
adopted by Congress regarding the issue of a digital first sale doctrine, is
no longer a viable plan.
In the meantime, scholars, interest groups, and the legislature have
all proposed various solutions to the digital media dilemma. 221 Initially,
Congress should expressly determine that the transfer of digital media is
a sale because of the growing importance of digital media in the modern
world, and without this threshold conclusion, the digital first doctrine
cannot exist. 222 Additionally, I propose that Congress should modify the
Copyright Act to expressly permit the “creation” of a copyrighted digital
work for the purpose of transferring that particular copy so long as only
one copy exists after the transaction. In addition, Congress should clarify
that the seller must own a legally purchased copy to be able to transfer it.
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration

220. Capital Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
221. See, e.g., Mencher, supra note 12, at 66 (discussing a “container” solution, which would
allow the music industry to control the distribution of digital media); DENA CHEN ET AL., PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE, PROVIDING AN INCIDENTAL COPIES EXEMPTION FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS AND ENDUSERS 15 (2011), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/craincidentalcopies.pdf
(suggesting a solution that would bring the necessary incidental copying of phonorecords for lawful
transfers out of the scope of copyright infringement); see also Hayes, supra note 37, at 859
(proposing a solution where consumers would be allowed to decide whether to purchase the digital
media or license the digital media and discussing that by purchasing the media, the consumer would
have the benefit of the first sale doctrine and be able to legally sell their media to other individuals;
however, the consumer would have no recourse if the digital file was to become corrupted or
obsolete). This article additionally explains that if the consumer chooses to license the media, the
digital files would not be subject to the first sale doctrine because the consumer would not actually
own the media; however, the consumer may enjoy other benefits at the copyright owner’s
discretion. Id. These benefits may include the copyright owner providing the media in multiple
formats to ensure the issue of obsoleteness did not affect the consumer. Id. at 860.
222. See, e.g., Skyla Mitchell, Note, Reforming Section 115: Escape from the Byzantine World
of Mechanical Licensing, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1239, 1290 (2007) (finding it imperative
that the licensing issue with digital music be addressed by Congress, although not necessarily that
digital music transfers be labeled as a sale); Uetz, supra note 92, at 190 (stating that the courts have
confused the various meanings of the word “license” and further confused the difficult question of
whether a transfer of digital music constitutes a sale or a license).
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proposed similar language to implement a digital first sale doctrine. 223
This language would have constituted section 109(f) of the Copyright
Act, but it was ultimately removed from the final version of the
DMCA. 224 The proposed language stated, in relevant part: “[t]he
authorization for use set forth in subsection (a) [the first sale doctrine]
applies where the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord in a digital
format lawfully made under this title . . . distributes the work by means
of transmission to a single recipient, if that person erases or destroys his
or her copy or phonorecord at substantially the same time. The
reproduction of the work, to the extent necessary for such performance,
display, distribution, is not an infringement.” H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. §
4 (1997).
This change would permit the transfer of digital media without
interfering with the intended result of copyright protection. I would
narrow this proposal by including language dictating that the seller must
engage in a digital media transfer via software that ensures substantial
compliance with this provision, requiring the seller not to retain a copy
of the digital file after the transfer has been completed. Such software
can ensure that copyright laws are followed and provide assurance for
copyright owners.
ReDigi’s software, Media Manager, 225 would sufficiently comply
with this provision, and it would ensure added piece of mind for
copyright owners. Additionally, both Amazon and Apple have proposed
secondary digital media markets that institute “the cloud,” which would
essentially erase the digital media off of all devices the owner has by
eliminating the owner’s ability to access the media.226 These protections
would ensure substantial compliance with the proposed modification
because it would make certain that only one user “owns” the file,
through permitted access, at any given time.
The overall purpose of the first sale doctrine has enduring value in
the digital age, and the application of the doctrine to digital media can be
effectively regulated through such technology, 227 including ReDigi’s
method or the “cloud lockers” used by Amazon and Apple. 228
223. Graham, supra note 106, at 50.
224. Id.
225. See supra note 159 (discussing the process in which ReDigi’s Media Manager software
operates).
226. Streitfeld, supra note 113.
227. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 332
(2013).
228. Cloud lockers can store digital media on an external hard drive that may be accessed by
users through the Internet. Phillip Pavlick, Comment, Music Lockers: Getting Lost in a Cloud of
Infringement, 23 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 247, 253 (2013). A user may only access his or
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Businesses implementing these technologies should be encouraged to
create additional safeguards that protect copyright owners and facilitate
a secondary market similar to the one enjoyed in the physical world.
VI. CONCLUSION
The dilemma between consumers and copyright owners concerning
the appropriate amount of protection for copyrighted works has been
debated for centuries. Both Congress and the courts have attempted to
strike the proper balance between the two conflicting sides. However, in
ReDigi, the court struck an imbalance, stifling innovation with a rigid
interpretation and throwing off the equilibrium between consumers and
copyright owners with respect to copyrighted works. Applying the first
sale doctrine to digital media would once again restore the proper
balance between consumers and copyright owners; otherwise, consumers
do not have a reasonable mode in which to meaningfully dispose of a
growing portion of personal property in the modern age.
Arguably, the advent of digital media has rendered parts of the
Copyright Act unclear, especially with respect to the first sale doctrine.
However, the language of the first sale doctrine is broad and encourages
application of the doctrine to digital media, and this application
comports with the growth in modern technology. 229 Further, the courts
have the authority to apply the first sale doctrine to digital media,
without further invention or change from Congress, because Congress
has expressly allowed for the Copyright Act to be applied to new
creations of media. 230
Both Congress and the courts have the authority and resources to
address the issue of a digital first sale doctrine, but neither has taken any
significant action. Modern consumers are at a loss, while copyright
owners are enjoying an unprecedented growing monopoly. The court’s
ruling in ReDigi has solidified the status quo for now, but change must
be on the horizon in order to restore the balance between copyright
owners and consumers. As the courts have shifted the responsibility of
sorting out this issue to the legislature, it is time for Congress to revisit
the Copyright Act and make the necessary changes to ensure that
consumers have control over their property and that creative works
continue to pervade society.

her own digital media using a personal password. Id. at 254.
229. Tussey, supra note 178, at 487.
230. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
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